

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 01186

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: SADAT/WEIZMAN MEETING

SUMMARY: SADAT DISCOURAGED BY WEIZMAN MEETING. WEIZMAN APPARENTLY PRESSED FOR RETENTION ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN SINAI, INCLUDING SHARM EL SHEIKH, AND RETENTION ISRAELI AIRDROMES THERE. WHILE SADAT CONSIDERS WEIZMAN SINCERE, HE VIEWS POINTS MADE BY WEIZMAN ON BEGIN'S INSTRUCTION AS THROW-BACK TO ISRAELI CONCEPTS PRIOR SADAT VISIT TO JERUSALEM. HE HAD TOLD WEIZMAN HE COULD NOT AGREE. WEIZMAN HAD APPEALED TO HIM TO TRY TO RESOLVE PROBLEM, BUT UP TO NOW SADAT COULD SEE NO WAY TO DO SO. SADAT MADE APPEAL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HELP TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS THEIR SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED WITHOUT RETENTION OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN SINAI. END SUMMARY.

1. WEIZMAN, WHO ARRIVED EGYPT MORNING JANUARY 11, MET WITH SADAT FOR AN HOUR LATER SAME DAY IN ASWAN. VP MUBARAK AND GAMASY WERE ALSO PRESENT. I MET WITH SADAT (AND MUBARAK) IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. WITH HIS MEETING WITH WEIZMAN FRESH IN HIS MIND, SADAT IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED
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INTO A SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING.

2. AS I GO THROUGH MY NOTES, I FIND ONLY THREE REFERENCES TO SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH WEIZMAN ALLEGEDLY MADE. THESE HAVE TO DO WITH THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN SINAI, THE ISRAELI AIR DROMES THERE AND SHARM EL SHEIKH. ON THE SETTLEMENTS, WEIZMAN APPARENTLY EMPHASIZED ISRAELI

DESIRE RETAIN SOME SETTLEMENTS IN SINAI. SADAT NOTED THAT PERTINENT BEGIN STATEMENT, WHICH I HAD EARLIER GIVEN TO MUBARAK, ALSO MAKES THIS VERY CLEAR. IF ALL ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS CANNOT BE RETAINED, WEIZMAN HAD SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS SOME MIGHT BE. SIMILARLY, WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAELI AIRDROMES, WEIZMAN HAD SUGGESTED THAT AT LEAST ONE BE RETAINED. ON SHARM EL SHEIKH, ALTHOUGH WEIZMAN HAD EARLIER DISCOUNTED ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, IN JUST CONCLUDED MEETING HE HAD CONTENTED THAT THE ISRAELI PEOPLE HAVE BEEN "MOBILIZED" AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR TO EXPECT TO RETAIN THAT LOCATION.

3. NET EFFECT OF WEIZMAN'S PRESENTATION WAS NEGATIVE AS FAR AS SADAT WAS CONCERNED. SADAT COMMENTED THAT WEIZMAN IS SINCERE, BUT THE POINTS THAT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY MAKING ON BEGIN'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE A THROW-BACK TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPTS PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM. POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON THESE SINAI MATTERS WERE CLEARLY "GRAVE ONES." THEY COULD BE SUMMARIZED IN A FEW WORDS: EGYPT BELIEVES IN PEACE OR LAND; ISRAEL WANTS BOTH. . --""--

4. SADAT SAID HE HAD TOLD WEIZMAN THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI DEMANDS. WEIZMAN'S CLAIM THAT THE ORDINARY ISRAELI CITIZEN BELIEVES BEGIN HAS GIVEN EVERYTHING AWAY IN SINAI WITHOUT GETTING ANYTHING IN EXCHANGE WAS SIMPLY
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NOT TRUE. PREVIOUSLY THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED IN THE AREA AND EVERY ARAB HAD BEEN MOBILIZED AGAINST THEM FOR THE LAST THIRTY YEARS. ALL THIS HAS NOW BEEN OVERCOME THROUGH SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM. ISRAEL IS ACCEPTED IN THE AREA AND HE, SADAT, WAS READY FOR A FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATURE OF PEACE. BUT THIS COULD ONLY BE A PACKAGE DEAL AND HE COULD NOT GIVE AWAY EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. WERE HE TO DO SO, THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WOULD CHARGE THAT HE HAD DECEIVED THEM. HE HAD TOLD WEIZMAN, "THE LAND IS OURS, NOT YOURS. YOU ALREADY HAVE THE CONCESSIONS ON THE NATURE OF PEACE." IF ISRAELI DEMANDS WERE TO BE ACCEPTED, THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WOULD CHARGE THAT EVERYTHING HAS BEEN GIVEN AWAY TO THE ISRAELIS AND NOTHING HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

5. WEIZMAN HAD CLAIMED THAT THIS SITUATION IS MORE THAN THE ISRAELI GOVT CAN SOLVE. SADAT HAD TO HELP. AT ONE POINT WEIZMAN HAD SAID, "YOU STARTED ALL THIS, NOW YOU MUST FIND SOME WAY OF RESOLVING IT." SADAT HAD RESPONDED THAT HE COULD NOT COPE WITH THESE ISRAELI DEMANDS. WHILE HE ADMITTEDLY HAD MUCH MORE FLEXIBILITY TO MANEUVER, HE COULD NOT AGREE TO WEIZMAN'S PROPOSALS FOR A CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SINAI. IT WILL NOT BRING PEACE.

"SOMEONE WILL RISE EVEN BEFORE I LEAVE OFFICE AND WILL CHARGE THAT SADAT HAS GIVEN AWAY EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGN TERRITORY." THESE CRITICAL ISSUES HAD BEEN LEFT DANGLING.

6. SADAT THEN MADE AN APPEAL TO PRESIDENT CARTER. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THEY HAD MET LAST APRIL, THREE ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED: (A) WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, (B) THE NATURE OF PEACE, AND (C) THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. ON WITHDRAWAL, HE AND PRESIDENT

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

CARTER HAD AGREED. ON THE NATURE OF PEACE, HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO ACCEPT THIS UNTIL FIVE YEARS AFTER THE PEACE WHEN THE PARTIES COULD SIT TOGETHER TO DISCUSS NORMALIZATION. AS WE KNEW, HOWEVER, HE HAS NOW AGREED WITH THE ISRAELIS TO EVERYTHING CONCERNING THE NATURE OF PEACE (DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION, OPEN BORDERS, TRADE, ETC.) IN A PACKAGE DEAL ALSO INVOLVING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD COME A LONG WAY AND HAD BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS BECAUSE HIS PEOPLE SUPPORT HIM.

7. HE RECALLED HAVING TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT WHENEVER DIFFICULTIES WERE FACED BY THE LATTER, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP. HIS INITIATIVE IN TRAVELING TO JERUSALEM WAS THE RESULT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S APPEAL FOR HELP. NOW, SADAT STATED, HE NEEDS PRESIDENT CARTER'S HELP ON THIS ISSUE. HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO THINK OF WHAT MIGHT BE DONE, BUT UP TO NOW HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK. SECURITY COULD BE GUARANTEED IN MANY WAYS .

WITHOUT AN ISRAELI PRESENCE, INCLUDING BY U.S.-MANNED
MONITORING STATIONS AND UNEF. BUT HE COULD NOT UNDER
ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO HAVING ISRAELI SOLDIERS OR
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CIVILIANS REMAIN ON EGYPTIAN SOIL.

8. IN MY PRESENCE, SADAT INSTRUCTED MUBARAK TO MAKE IT
CLEAR TO GAMASY NOT TO BUDGE ON THESE POINTS.
9. LATER IN OUR CONVERSATION, SADAT SAID THAT WEIZMAN
PLANS TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, TO BE
PRESENT FOR THE OPENING OF THE UPCOMING POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
MEETING. WEIZMAN HAD ASKED THAT GAMASY ALSO BE THERE.
SADAT SAID THAT UNLESS THE ISSUES INVOLVING THE SINAI
ARE RESOLVED IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE NEXT FEW
DAYS, HE DID NOT SEE HOW HE COULD AGREE THAT GAMASY ATTEND.

10. COMMENT: SADAT WAS OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED WITH
WEIZMAN TALK AND WHAT IT PORTENDS. HE IS BECOMING WORRIED
THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE POCKETING THE CONCESSIONS HE HAS
ALREADY MADE WITHOUT GIVING A COMMENSURATE RETURN. HAVING
IN MIND USG POLICY ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND RELATED
MATTERS, HE HOPES THAT PRESIDENT CARTER CAN SOMEHOW DO
SOMETHING TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS NOT TO PRESS THIS ISSUE.
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